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Abstract
We consider a scenario in which a database stores sensitive data of users and an analyst wants to
estimate statistics of the data. The users may suffer a cost when their data are used in which case
they should be compensated. The analyst wishes to get an accurate estimate, while the users want to
maximize their utility. We want to design a mechanism that can estimate statistics accurately without
compromising users’ privacy.
Since users’ costs and sensitive data may be correlated, it is important to protect the privacy of both
data and cost. We model this correlation by assuming that a user’s unknown sensitive data determines a
distribution from a set of publicly known distributions and a user’s cost is drawn from that distribution.
We propose a stronger model of privacy preserving mechanism where users are compensated whenever
they reveal information about their data to the mechanism. In this model, we design a Bayesian incentive
compatible and privacy preserving mechanism that guarantees accuracy and protects the privacy of both
cost and data.
∗E-mail: {lkf,yuhanlyu}@cs.dartmouth.edu. Partially supported by NSF grants CCF-0728869 and CCF-1016778.
1 Introduction
Using the Internet, it is fairly easy to collect sensitive personal data. Online service providers implicitly
compensate users who provide their personal data, by offering improved services based on their data. How-
ever, this implicit exchange may not be fair to the individual, since different people may have different costs
— a loss in expected utility over future events — for use of their data. Moreover, companies rarely give
well-defined guarantees concerning data privacy and compensation. When the compensation is less than the
individual’s perceived cost, the individual may choose not to participate. Here, we explore mechanisms to
fairly compensate individuals for use of their personal data.
In order to motivate users to participate in a mechanism, the payment to a user should be at least the cost
to the user. Thus, the mechanism should learn information about users’ costs. Ghosh and Roth [8] initiate a
study of this problem. Their mechanism asks users to report their costs for the use of their data to estimate
statistics, and then selects some of the users (based on their stated costs) to determine the statistics, and pays
these users accordingly. This mechanism is problematic when costs and personal data are correlated, since
users may be reluctant to reveal their costs if they are not guaranteed adequate compensation up front. For
example, suppose that a database indicates whether a vehicle has been damaged. When the database can
be publicly accessed, the owner of a damaged car cannot sell the car for the same price as the price of an
undamaged car. Thus, his cost for revealing data is higher than the owner of an undamaged car. Revealing
information about the costs may also reveal information about whether the car is damaged. Thus, it is
important to also guarantee privacy of individual payments.
We study this problem where costs are correlated with data. We model this correlation by assuming that
a user’s unknown data determines a distribution from a set of accurate and publicly known distributions and
the user’s cost is drawn from that distribution. We propose a model of a privacy preserving mechanism where
users are compensated whenever they reveal any information about their data to the mechanism, whether
directly, or indirectly by revealing their costs. In this model, we design a Bayesian incentive compatible
and individually rational mechanism, which produces accurate statistics and protects the privacy of data and
costs.
Problem Setting. There are n users, which we call players, denoted by [n]. Each player has sensitive data
Di ∈ [h], stored in a database D ∈ [h]n. Initially Di is the private information of player i. However, since
Di is also in the database, it’s value may be verified with player i’s permission. In addition, player i has a
value for his loss of privacy of his data. This value vi is private to player i, but it is correlated with Di. This
correlation is modeled as follows: If Di = t ∈ [h] then vi ∼ Ft, where Ft is a distribution of privacy costs
for players of type t that is known to all players and the mechanism. Ft correctly represents the distributions
of costs of type t players.
A query is a function Q : [h]n → R, mapping a database to a response. An example of a query is “what
is the number of people i in the database D with Di = j?”. A data analyst wants Q(D). Since the data are
sensitive, the data analyst accesses the database through a privacy preserving algorithm A. Therefore, the
data analyst does not receive Q(D) but receives an estimate A(D). To ensure the estimate is accurate, the
error |Q(D)−A(D)| should be small with high probability.
Differential privacy, introduced in [5], is an accepted way to measure privacy and privacy preserving
algorithms. Two databases D and D′ are adjacent if they differ in only one entry. An algorithm A satisfies
ǫ-differential privacy, where ǫ > 0, if for any pair of adjacent database D and D′ and any set I ⊆ R,
Pr[A(D) ∈ I] ≤ eǫ Pr[A(D′) ∈ I]. When ǫ = 0, it implies that the algorithm does not depend on D. If the
error |Q(D) − A(D)| is small with high probability, then the algorithm should have large ǫ. Thus, privacy
guarantees come at the expense of the accuracy.
Although an ǫ-differentially private algorithm can protect sensitive data, if a player allows his data to be
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used, he may incur a cost. We model this cost as linear in the privacy loss ǫ and his expected cost vi.1 Thus,
for player i to agree to the use of his data, his expected payment should be at least ǫvi.
A mechanism specifies a set of actions that players can take. The players take actions based on their
data and private costs. Thus, the input of the mechanism is a database and a vector of actions. The outputs
are an estimate sˆ and a payment vector p = (p1, . . . , pn). Since player i has a linear cost ǫvi, the utility of
player i is pi− ǫvi if Di is used in the mechanism, otherwise the utility is pi. We assume that all players are
rational and want to maximize their utilities. A mechanism is a direct mechanism if the action set equals the
set of all real numbers. That is, a direct mechanism asks players to report their costs. A direct mechanism
is truthful if every player reports his true cost in order to maximize his utility. Truth telling is a concept
defined for direct mechanisms. In this paper, we propose an indirect mechanism. Thus, we want to extend
the notion of truthfulness to indirect mechanisms. In our mechanism, there is a straightforward mapping,
described in Section 3, from player’s type set to player’s action set. We say that a player decides truthfully
if he picks the strategy corresponding to his type under this mapping.
In our paper, we will assume that the query/goal of the analyst is to estimate nj = |{i : Di = j}|.
Without loss of generality, we assume throughout the paper that the data analyst wants to estimate n1. We
seek to design a mechanism with the following properties.
1. Accuracy: A mechanism M is k-accurate, if for any database D, Pr[|sˆ− n1| ≥ k] ≤ 13 , when every
player decides truthfully. Note that the accuracy guarantee is independent of the size of the database
— the number k is fixed no matter how large the database is, or the sampled set is.
2. Differential Privacy: The estimate and payments satisfy ǫ-differential privacy.
3. Truthfulness: A mechanism is dominant strategy truthful if, for every player, deciding truthfully
maximizes his utility. A mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if, for every player,
assuming that other players’ costs are drawn from F according to their data and decide truthfully,
deciding truthfully maximizes his utility.
4. Individual Rationality: If a player’s utility is non-negative, then he should be willing to participate.
A mechanism is ex-post individually rational (EPIR) if the utility is non-negative for every player
when he decides truthfully. A mechanism is ex-interim individually rational (EIIR) if the expected
utility is non-negative for every player when he decides truthfully, where the randomness comes from
the mechanism and the costs of other players.
5. Payment Minimization: The summation of payments should be as little as possible.
To get permission to use a player’s data, the mechanism must compensate the player by at least his per-
ceived loss of privacy. But since costs are correlated with data, players may be reluctant to reveal their true
costs, unless they will be compensated for this. To avoid this seeming chicken-and-egg problem, the mech-
anism designer cannot resort to the revelation principle, which states that any mechanism can be realized
as a direct and truthful mechanism. In fact, [8] prove that if costs and data can be arbitrarily correlated and
player’s cost of privacy can be unbounded, then for any k < n/2, no k-accurate, direct, dominant strategy
truthful, EPIR, privacy preserving mechanism exists. On the other hand, we give a mechanism that provides
k-accuracy for any input value k when costs are correlated with data, and there is no bound on players’
cost of privacy. We get around the lower bound of [8] by using an indirect mechanism, and modeling the
correlation of values and data via publically known (and allowably unbounded) distributions.
1We can view this cost as due to the change in his utility from future events that depend on the answer he gives to the analyst.
This cost is approximately linear in ǫ and his expected utility, denoted by vi. Let g(A(D)) be the distribution of future events that
depends on A(D). Let wi be the player i’s utility for future events. Since A is ǫ-differentially private, g ◦A is also ǫ-differentially
private. Thus, for random variables y ∼ g(A(D)) and y′ ∼ g(A(D′)) and event b, Pr[y = b] ≤ eǫ Pr[y′ = b]. Therefore, we have
Ey∼g(A(D))[wi(y)]−Ey∼g(A(D′))[wi(y)] is approximately ǫEy∼g(A(D′))[wi(y)] or −ǫEy∼g(A(D′))[wi(y)], when ǫ is small.
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Privacy Issues when Costs are Correlated with Data. The objective of a privacy preserving mechanism
is that the increase in knowledge about a player’s data due to output of the mechanism is small. Previous
work on privacy in statistical databases assumes that the mechanism is associated with the database, such
that the mechanism can access the whole database without compromising a player’s privacy. However, if
the mechanism is separated from the database, then a player might not trust the mechanism and might not
want to reveal private information to the mechanism.
In our problem, in order to estimate n1, the mechanism should learn information about players’ data.
Suppose that the mechanism has a prior belief G about the data in D. That is, the mechanism believes that
the probability of Di = j is PrG[Di = j] according to the prior belief. The mechanism learns about Di if
the mechanism believes that Pr[Di = j] 6= PrG[Di = j] after running the mechanism, for some j. There
are two possible ways to learn about players’ data. The first way is to read Di explicitly. The second way
is to read players’ actions and deduce something about their Di. For example, if the mechanism is direct
and truthful, then the players report vi truthfully. Suppose that the prior belief is that every player’s data are
drawn from a uniform distribution. That is, PrG[Di = j] is the same for all i and j. If Fj(vi) < Fj′(vi)
for some j and j′, and player i truthfully reports vi, then the mechanism’s posterior belief is that Pr[Di =
j] < Pr[Di = j
′], which is different from the prior belief. Learning anything about a player’s data may
compromise a player’s privacy and should be compensated. Thus, there are two kinds of cost to a player that
should be compensated, one is for using the player’s data and one is for learning about the player’s data.
For the latter cost, we propose the concept of perfect data privacy, which is inspired by the concept
of perfect objective privacy introduced in [7]. A mechanism satisfies perfect data privacy if whenever the
mechanism’s posterior belief about a player’s data differs from its prior belief, the mechanism pays the
player. Under perfect data privacy, mechanisms can learn about a player’s cost, as long as that knowledge
does not reveal anything about his data. However, for a perfectly data private mechanism, if the mechanism
learns about a player’s data, then the mechanism always compensates the player, even when the mechanism
does not not use the player’s data to compute the estimate.
Our Main Contribution. We give a mechanism that is BIC, EIIR, O(ǫ−1)-accurate, perfectly data private,
and ǫ-differentially private. To achieve our privacy guarantees, we propose a posted-price-like mechanism,
described in Section 3. Given the set of types of players and the distributions of costs, the mechanism writes
a contract that offers a different expected payment for each type. Each player is offered this contract. If
a player accepts the contract, then his payment is determined by his verifiable type and the payment for
his type in the contract. The player’s action is either to accept the contract or reject the contract. A player
decides truthfully if a player with type j accepts the contract when ǫvi ≤ rj , where rj is the payment for type
j in the contract. We prove that this posted-price-like mechanism is BIC, EIIR, O(ǫ−1)-accurate, perfectly
data private, and ǫ-differentially private.
We seek a mechanism with a small payment. In Section 4, we define a benchmark for the expected
payment of a mechanism and compare the expected payment of our mechanism to this benchmark in two
different settings. When costs are non-negative, we show that our mechanism is close to the benchmark.
We also prove a lower bound on the accuracy that a direct and data private mechanism can achieve in
Section 2.
1.1 Related Work
Selling Privacy. Our paper is closely related to the privacy preserving mechanisms studied in [8]. In [8],
they extend the definition of ǫ-differentially private algorithms to ǫ-differentially private mechanisms. Under
their definition of an ǫ-differentially private mechanism, the randomness only comes from the mechanism.
In our model, since we want to protect the privacy of the costs, which are drawn from distributions, our
definition of an ǫ-differentially private mechanism relies both on the distributions of the costs and the ran-
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domness of the mechanism.
Differential Privacy. A comprehensive survey of differential privacy appears in [4]. Most of the previous
results are based on random perturbations of the output, and assume that the mechanism has the ability
to access the whole database. If the mechanism cannot access the whole database, Chaudhuri et al. [1]
and Klonowski et al. [12] show that random sampling is enough to ensure differential privacy with high
probability. That is, it is not necessary to add more noise to the output.
Differential Privacy and Mechanism Design. McSherry et al. [13] use a privacy preserving algorithm
as a tool to design an approximately dominant strategy truthful mechanism. Instead, we focus on treating
senstive data as a commodity that can be sold.
Privacy Concerns in Mechanisms. Traditional mechanism design theory focuses on drawing private infor-
mation from players in order to compute a result. However, if players have privacy concerns, they may not
want to reveal their information. Feigenbaum et al. [7] study how to quantify the information leakage to the
mechanism based on communication complexity.
Xiao [18] quantifies the information leakage in a mechanism based on information theory. In his model,
the outcome of a privacy preserving mechanism not only motivates the players to participate but also protects
the private information of players. In independent work, Nissam et al. [16] and Chen et al. [3] consider
privacy issues in mechanism design in the context of elections and discrete facility location.
Posted-Price Mechanisms. In a posted-price mechanism, player i is offered a price ri. If player i accepts
that price, then i pays ri to get the allocation. Goldberg et al. [9] show that the posted-price mechanism is
collusion resistant. Moreover, the players do not need to know or report their private values precisely. They
only decide to accept or reject the price. Chawla et al. [2] point out that this could be useful in reducing the
private information revealed to the mechanism.
Revenue Maximization in Bayesian Mechanism Design. In a classic paper, Myerson [14] characterizes
the optimal BIC selling mechanism to maximization the expected revenue. In procurement mechanisms,
each player is a supplier and each player’s production cost is private information. The auctioneer is the
buyer and wants to minimize the expected payment. In the computer science literature, an early paper in
this area characterizes the minimum-cost dominant strategy truthful auction to buy an s-t path in a graph [6].
Since then, there has been considerable interest in both frugal mechanism design (buying a feasible set at
low cost), and budget-constrained mechanism design (buying as good a set as possible subject to a budget).
Our work can be seen as a generalization of these questions to the setting of bidders who are reluctant to
reveal their costs, and the feasibility of a set depends on the private costs (via the correlation with data).
2 Model and Lower Bound
2.1 Model
There is a database D ∈ [h]n and n players, where each player has data Di. Player i with Di = j has a
private cost vi drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution function Fj . Note that this definition
is different from the traditional definition of a Bayesian setting. In the traditional definition, the distribution
of vi is known to every player and the mechanism. In our definition, the mechanism and players know that
each player’s vi is drawn from one of a set of distributions, but the particular distribution depends on the
individual player’s data, which is unknown to everyone but that player.
The goal of our mechanism is to estimate n1 based on D and determine the payment pi for every player
i. A mechanism first specifies the set of possible actions Y that players can take. Then, based on players’
actions and the database, the mechanism determines the estimate and payment. Formally, a mechanism is a
function M : Y n× [h]n → R×Rn. The mechanism has an a priori belief G about the data in D. That is, the
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mechanism believes that the probability of Di = j is PrG[Di = j]. Recall that the mechanism learns about
Di if, after running the mechanism, the mechanism believes that Pr[Di = j] 6= PrG[Di = j] for some j.
We use a vector x ∈ {0, 1}n to indicate whether the mechanism learns something about each player’s data.
If the mechanism learns about Di, then xi = 1. A mechanism is perfectly data private if, when xi = 1,
player i’s expected payment from the mechanism is at least ǫvi. We focus on randomized mechanisms in
this paper, that is, xi and payment pi are random variables.
Next, we define the utility for a player. If xi = 1, there is a cost ǫvi to player i, since something about
Di is learned. For y ∈ Y n representing all players’ actions, the utility for player i is ui(y, vi) = pi − ǫxivi,
where (sˆ, p) = M(y,D). In this paper, we assume that players are rational, so players want to maximize
their expected utilities. The strategy of player i is a function qi : R × [h] → Y mapping from vi and Di to
an action. Since players want to maximize their expected utilities, they will take the action that is not worse
than any other action.
Finally, we introduce the solution concept. A profile of strategies q1, . . . , qn is a Bayesian-Nash equi-
librium if for all i, vi, and y′i ∈ Y , E[ui(q(vi, v−i,D), vi)] ≥ E[ui((y′i, q−i(v−i,D−i)), vi)], where the
randomness is from the mechanism and the randomness of v−i. A direct mechanism is Bayesian incentive
compatible (BIC) if qi(vi,Di) = vi is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every player i.
2.2 Lower Bound
In order to ensure that players have incentive to participate the mechanism, we wish that the mechanism is
individually rational. However, we can show that for any direct, BIC, and EIIR mechanism, there is a lower
bound of accuracy. Since the condition of EIIR is weaker than EPIR, the lower bound for EIIR also implies
a lower bound for EPIR mechanisms.
Lemma 2.1. If the functions Fi are arbitrary functions with unbounded range, then for any k < n/2, no
k-accurate, direct, BIC, EIIR, and perfectly data private mechanism exists.
Proof. Suppose that M is a BIC, EIIR, perfectly data private, and k-accurate mechanism. First, we show
that M must access at least one player’s cost or data. Assume that M does not access any cost or data.
Thus, M randomly output an estimate sˆ, which is independent of costs and data. For a database D1 with
all entries equal to one, since M is k-accurate, Pr[sˆ ∈ [n, n − k]] ≥ 23 . Similarly, if a database D0 has no
entries equal to one, then Pr[sˆ ∈ [0, k]] ≥ 23 . Because k < n/2, [n, n − k] and [0, k] do not overlap. But
the summation of these two probabilities is greater than one, which is impossible. Hence, M must access at
least one player’s cost or data.
Suppose that Di ∈ {1, 2} and F1(v) 6= F2(v) for all v. For any vˆ, if M access vi = vˆ, then the
mechanism must pay player i, since F1(vˆ) = Pr[vi = vˆ|Di = j] 6= Pr[vi = vˆ|Di = j′] = F2(vˆ) and
M is perfectly data private. Let xi be the indicator random variable representing whether player i’s cost is
accessed. Let pj be the random variable representing player i’s payment. Since M is BIC, we suppose that
players other than i report truthfully. Since the mechanism decides to access vi based on v−i, Pr[xi = 1]
is independent of vi. Because M must access at least one player’s cost, we can find a player i, such that
Pr[xi = 1] > 0. For a fixed vi, the expected utility of i is E[pi] − ǫviE[xi]. Since the range of F is
unbounded, we can find another v′i >
E[pi]
ǫE[xi]
. Since M is EIIR, we have E[p′i] ≥ ǫv′iE[xi]. Thus, for player
i with cost vi, if i overbids v′i, the utility is E[p′i] − ǫviE[xi] ≥ ǫv′iE[xi] − ǫviE[xi] > E[pi] − ǫviE[xi].
Thus, player i can increase expected utility by overbidding. Hence, M is not BIC.
Our mechanism, which is explained in the next section, is an indirect mechanism since it does not ask for
players’ costs. The revelation principle, which states that if there exists an indirect mechanism implementing
a function in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, then there also exists a direct BIC mechanism implementing the
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same function, is irrelevant under the desire for perfect data privacy. It is easy to construct a direct mech-
anism from our indirect mechanism. However, this direct mechanism accesses all players’ data without
compensating all players. Thus, this direct mechanism is not perfectly data private.
ǫ-Differential Privacy. The traditional definition of ǫ-differential privacy compares the outcomes of the
algorithm applied to adjacent databases. However, with a mechanism that offers payments, the mechanism
may use both the database and the replies to the mechanism to compute an estimate and payments. Since
replies depend on the individuals’ costs, we compare the outcomes of the mechanism applied to two cost-
data pairs (v,D) and (v′,D′). A cost vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) is drawn according to a database D, if
vi is drawn from Fj , where Di = j. Two cost-data pairs (v,D) and (v′,D′) are adjacent, if D and D′
differ only in the i-th entry and v and v′ are independently drawn according to database D and D′. A BIC
mechanism is ǫ-differentially private if, for any pair of adjacent cost-data pairs, the estimate and payments
satisfy ǫ-differential privacy.
Bayesian Assumptions. Our definition of ǫ-differential privacy is based on the common belief F . That is,
the player decides his strategy assuming that other players’ costs are drawn from F and all players believe
this assumption. If a player allows his data to be used, then he may incur a expected cost ǫvi. The expected
cost to the player depends on ǫ and thus also depends on the common belief F . Having a common belief
is a traditional assumption in the Bayesian setting. Moreover, most BIC mechanisms become meaningless
when the common belief is not true. Thus, we assume that the common belief F is correct.
3 Mechanism
In this section, we give a perfectly data private, BIC, EIIR, ǫ-differentially private, and O(ǫ−1)-accurate
mechanism. Every player i has data Di ∈ [h]. To start, we assume that Fj is continuous for j ∈ {1, 2}.
The mechanism designs and offers contracts to players. The contract guarantees an expected payment to
each player who accepts the contract. The players decide to accept or reject the contract. Thus, the possible
actions for players are “accept” or “reject”. The mechanism uses the data of players who accept the contract
to estimate n1. The estimate is unbiased if the expected value of the estimate is n1. To obtain an unbiased
estimate, the set of players who accept the contract should be unbiased, that is, the probability of a player
accepting the contract should be equal for all players. Moreover, since the mechanism pays players, the
costs of players in the accepting set should be bounded.
The mechanism first finds αj for j ∈ [h], such that Fj(αj) = c, where c will be determined later. Then,
each player i is given a contract : “If Di = j, your expected payment will be ǫαj .” A player i with Di = j
decides truthfully if, when vi ≤ αj , player i accepts the contract and rejects otherwise. Let W be the set
of players who accept the contract. If all players decide truthfully, the cost to each player in W is bounded
by maxj αj . Since for player i with Di = j, Pr[vi ≤ αj ] = c, every player accepts the contract with
probability c. Thus, W is an unbiased and cost-bounded sample set.
Since the probability that a player accepts the contract is c, the value m := |{i ∈ W : Di = 1}| is a
random variable bin(n1, c) from a binomial distribution2 Bin(n1, c). Since the expected value of m is cn1,
m
c is an unbiased estimate of n1. We say
m
c is a naı¨ve estimate of n1.
We explain how to produce an estimate that satisfies ǫ-differential privacy. Although the naive estimate
is an unbiased estimate of n1, it does not satisfy differential privacy. Consider an adjacent pairs of cost-data
pairs (v,D) and (v′,D′), where D and D′ differ in the i-th entry. Let n1 be the number of player i with
Di = 1 and n′1 be the number of players i with D′i = 1. The naive estimate does not satisfy differential
2A binomial distribution with parameter n and p is denoted by Bin(n, p). The probability density function of Bin(n, p) is
f(k;n, p) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k. Let bin(n, p) denote a random variable drawn from Bin(n, p). The expected value of bin(n, p) is
np and variance is np(1− p).
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Mechanism 1: ǫ-differentially private mechanism
input : privacy parameter ǫ; cost distributions Fj , j ∈ [h]
output: estimate sˆ; payment p
1 Pick a real number c ∈ (0, 1)
2 Find αj for all j ∈ [h], such that Fj(αj) = c.
3 For each player i, offer a contract:
4 If Di = j, the expected payment will be ǫαj .
5 Let W = {i : i accepts contract}.
6 Let m = |{i ∈W : Di = 1}|.
7 Let s = 1c (m+ lap(
1
ǫ )).
8 sˆ = s if s ∈ [0, n], 0 if s < 0, n if s > n
9 pi =
{
0 if i /∈W
ǫ(αj + lap(γǫ )), where γ := |maxj αj −minj αj | if i ∈W and Di = j
10 return (sˆ, p)
privacy, since if Di = 1 and vi ≤ ǫα1, then an outsider can infer Di easily by comparing the naive estimates
of n1 and n′1. Thus, we should introduce a random noise to the naive estimate to satisfy differential privacy.
The mechanism uses the Laplacian distribution as a source of the random noise. The Laplacian noise is
commonly used to obtain differential privacy. A Laplacian distribution with mean 0 and parameter b > 0 is
denoted by Lap(b). The probability density function of Lap(b) is
f(x) =
1
2b
exp
(
−|x|
b
)
.
Let lap(b) denote a random variable drawn from Lap(b).
In order to make estimate satisfy differential privacy, the mechanism adds random noise lap(1ǫ ) to the
naive estimate. Since the mean of the Laplacian noise is zero, s = 1c (m + lap(
1
ǫ )) is an unbiased estimate
of n1. However, s might be larger than n or be negative, both of which are meaningless. We truncate s to
get sˆ, that is when s > n, the mechanism outputs n and when s < 0, the mechanism outputs 0.
We also use the Laplacian noises to produce payments that satisfy ǫ-differential privacy. By the con-
struction of the contract, for any player i with Di = j who accepts the contract, the mechanism pays player
i for ǫαj in expectation. If the mechanism pays player i for ǫαj deterministically, then an outsider can infer
player i’s data easily. Thus, we should introduce noise to the payments. We add noise ǫ lap(γǫ ) to the pay-
ment, where γ := |maxj αj −minj αj |. Thus, pi = ǫ(αj + lap(γǫ )). Since the expected value of lap(γǫ ) is
zero, the expected payment of player i is ǫαj , which satisfies the guarantee in the contract. Moreover, since
ǫαj is larger than ǫvi, the mechanism is EIIR. The formal description of the mechanism is in Mechanism 1.
Lemma 3.1. Mechanism 1 is perfectly data private.
Proof. Let yi be player i’s reply to the contract. By construction of the contract, if i decides truthfully, then
Pr[yi = “accept” | Di = j] = c for all j ∈ [h]. That is, the probability of accepting the contract and
Di are independent. Thus, for any i, the mechanism cannot learn about Di by reading yi. Moreover, the
mechanism only reads Di, where i ∈ W . Since player i ∈ W with Di = j is paid ǫαj in expectation and
vi ≤ αj , the mechanism satisfies the requirement.
Lemma 3.2. Mechanism 1 is BIC and EIIR.
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Proof. (BIC) The payments for players who is not in W are always 0. For player i, there are two cases.
Case 1: Di = j and vi ≤ αj . Accepting the contract will get expected payment ǫ(αj − vi) ≥ 0.
Case 2: Di = j and vi > αj . Accepting the contract will get expected payment ǫ(αj − vi) < 0.
(EIIR) Suppose that every player decides truthfully. Then only players with vi ≤ αj and Di = j for
some j are in W . Since the expected payment for i with Di = j is ǫαj , the expected utility of the player is
non-negative.
Two random variables x1 and x2 are ǫ-mutually bounded, if ∀I ⊆ R, Pr[x1 ∈ I] ≤ eǫ Pr[x2 ∈ I] and
Pr[x2 ∈ I] ≤ eǫ Pr[x1 ∈ I].
Lemma 3.3 (Fact 2 in [8]). If x1 and x2 are ǫ-mutually bounded and f is a function, then f(x1) and f(x2)
are also ǫ-mutually bounded.
Lemma 3.4 ([5]). Let x1 and x2 be two random variables. If |x1−x2| ≤ k, then x1+lap(kǫ ) and x2+lap(kǫ )
are ǫ-mutually bounded.
The next two lemmas address the ǫ-differential privacy of the payment and the estimate. Let (v,D) and
(v′,D′) be adjacent cost-data pairs. Let (sˆ, p) and (sˆ′, p′) be the results for (v,D) and (v′,D′) respectively.
Lemma 3.5. For any I ⊆ R, Pr[sˆ ∈ I] ≤ eǫ Pr[sˆ′ ∈ I].
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that 1 = Di and D′i 6= 1. First, Pr[sˆ ∈ I] =
∫
v−i∈Rn−1 Pr[sˆ ∈
I | v−i] Pr[v−i]dv−i. Similarly, Pr[sˆ′ ∈ I] =
∫
v−i∈Rn−1 Pr[sˆ
′ ∈ I | v−i] Pr[v−i]dv−i. Let qˆw and qˆ′w be
two random variables, which are equal to sˆ and sˆ′ when v−i = w. If qˆw and qˆ′w are ǫ-mutually bounded for
all w, then sˆ and sˆ′ are ǫ-mutually bounded, since then
Pr[sˆ ∈ I] =
∫
w∈Rn−1
Pr[sˆ ∈ I | v−i = w] Pr[v−i = w]dw
=
∫
w∈Rn−1
Pr[qˆw ∈ I] Pr[v−i = w]dw
≤
∫
w∈Rn−1
eǫ Pr[qˆ′w ∈ I] Pr[v−i = w]dw
=
∫
w∈Rn−1
eǫ Pr[sˆ′ ∈ I | v−i = w] Pr[v−i = w]dw = eǫ Pr[sˆ′ ∈ I].
The case Pr[sˆ′ ∈ I] ≤ eǫ Pr[sˆ ∈ I] can be shown by a symmetric argument.
Here, we show that qˆw and qˆ′w are ǫ-mutually bounded for all w. Fix v−i = w. Let Ww and W ′w
be the sets of players accepting the contract when applying the algorithm to inputs (v,D) and (v′,D′)
respectively. Let mw := |{i : Di = 1, i ∈ Ww}| and m′w := |{i : D′i = 1, i ∈ W ′w}|. When applying
the mechanism to inputs (v,D) and (v′,D′), the mechanism computes sw = 1c (mw + lap(
1
ǫ )) and s
′
w =
1
c (m
′
w + lap(1ǫ )) respectively. Then, the mechanism truncates sw and s
′
w to get sˆw and sˆ′w. By Lemma 3.3,
since multiplication and truncation are functions, it suffices to show that mw + lap(1ǫ ) and m
′
w + lap(1ǫ ) are
ǫ-mutually bounded when v−i = w. Since W \W ′ is either the empty set or {i}, the difference between
mw and m′w is at most one. Thus, Lemma 3.4 implies that mw + lap(1ǫ ) and m
′
w + lap(1ǫ ) are ǫ-mutually
bounded. Thus, qˆw and qˆ′w are ǫ-mutually bounded for all w, and hence sˆ and sˆ′ are mutually bounded.
Lemma 3.6. For all i ∈ [n] and for all I ⊆ R, Pr[pi ∈ I] ≤ eǫ Pr[p′i ∈ I].
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that Di = 1 and D′i 6= 1. For player j 6= i, if j /∈ W , the
payment is zero. If j ∈ W , the payment to j depends only on the data Dj and does not depend on the
set of players receiving payments. Thus, pj does not change and we only need to consider pi. Note that
pi 6= 0 only happens if player i is in W . If pi 6= 0, then pi is a random variable P 1 = ǫ(α1 + lap(γǫ )).
Thus, for any I ⊆ R \ {0}, the probability Pr[pi ∈ I] = cPr[P 1 ∈ I], where c is the probability of that a
player accepts the contract. The probability Pr[pi = 0] = (1 − c) + cPr[P 1 = 0]. Suppose that D′i = j′.
Symmetrically, let P 2 = ǫ(αj′ + lap(γǫ )), for any I ⊆ R \ {0}, the probability Pr[p′i ∈ I] = cPr[P 2 ∈ I]
and Pr[p′i = 0] = (1− c) + cPr[P 2 = 0].
Thus, it suffices to show that P 1 and P 2 are ǫ-mutually bounded. By Lemma 3.3, since multiplication
is a function, it is sufficient to show that α1 + lap(γǫ ) and αj′ + lap(
γ
ǫ ) are ǫ-mutually bounded. By Lemma
3.4, since |α1 − αj′ | ≤ γ, α1 + lap(γǫ ) and αj′ + lap(γǫ ) are ǫ-mutually bounded.
Lemma 3.7. Mechanism 1 is
√
3(n1(1−c)c +
2
ǫ2c2
)-accurate.
Proof. Since the error term |sˆ− n1| is smaller than |s− n1|, we can analyze |s− n1| to get a bound on the
error. Since E[m] = cn1, E[s] = 1c (E[m] + E[lap(
1
ǫ )]) = n1 by linearity of expectation.
|sˆ− n1| ≤ |s− n1| = 1
c
|m+ lap(1
ǫ
)− n1c| = 1
c
|bin(n1, c) + lap(1
ǫ
)− E[bin(n1, c) + lap(1
ǫ
)]|.
In order to prove that accuracy with high probability, we use Chebyshev’s inequality.
Lemma 3.8 (Chebyshev’s inequality). Let X be a random variable with expected value µ and variance σ2.
For any real number k > 0, Pr[|X − µ| ≥ kσ] ≤ 1
k2
.
We set k =
√
3 and let X ∼ bin(n1, c) + lap(1ǫ ) with V ar[X] = n1c(1− c) + 2ǫ2 to get
Pr
[
|bin(n1, c) + lap(1
ǫ
)− E[bin(n1, c) + lap(1
ǫ
)]| ≥
√
3(n1c(1− c) + 2
ǫ2
)
]
≤ 1
3
.
This is equivalent to
Pr
[
1
c
|bin(n1, c) + lap(1
ǫ
)− E[bin(n1, c) + lap(1
ǫ
)]| ≥
√
3(
n1(1− c)
c
+
2
ǫ2c2
)
]
≤ 1
3
.
Thus, Pr
[
|sˆ− n1| ≥
√
3(n1(1−c)c +
2
ǫ2c2
)
]
≤ 13 .
The mechanism can pick c freely. If the mechanism picks a constant c such that n(1−c)c ≤ 2ǫ2c2 , the
mechanism is O(ǫ−1) accurate.
We will extend this result to general data entry and discrete cost distributions in Section 3.1. Thus, we
have the main theorem.
Theorem 3.9. Mechanism 1 is BIC, EIIR, O(ǫ−1)-accurate, perfectly data private, and ǫ-differentially
private.
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3.1 Extensions and Computational Issues
General Database Entries. Suppose that the entry of database has d attributes, that is, Di ∈ [h]d. Given a
sequence a1, . . . , ad, where aj ∈ [h], the data analyst wants to estimate |{i : ∀jDij = aj}|. For any Di, we
can transform Di to a single attribute data D′i = 1 +
∑d−1
i=0 Dij × di, such that D′i ∈ [hd]. Then, we can
apply the mechanism to estimate the number of players with D′i = 1 +
∑d−1
i=0 aj × di.
Discrete Cost Distributions. When Fj is a discrete probability function, the major difficulty is that for
a given c and j, we may not find a suitable αj , such that Fj(αj) = c, because the cumulative probability
function of a discrete distribution is a step function. However, the mechanism can provide different contracts
to different players and this ability allows us to design a mechanism for discrete case.
The basic idea is that the mechanism uses randomness to pick αj such that every player has equal
probability c to accept the contract. For a given c and for each j, if there is no αj such that Fj(αj) = c, then
the mechanism finds the largest α−j and the smallest α
+
j such that Fj(α
−
j ) = c
−
j < c and Fj(α
+
j ) = c
+
j > c.
Note that a player i with Di = j accepts the contract if his cost is smaller than the expected payment. If
the expected payment is α+j , then the player accepts the contract with probability c
+
j > c. On the other
hand, if the expected payment is α−j , then the player accepts the contract with probability c
−
j < c. Let
βj =
c−c−j
c+j −c
−
j
. Player i is given a contract “If Di = j, your expected payment is ǫαj in expectation,” where
Pr[αj = α
−
j ] = 1 − βj and Pr[αj = α+j ] = βj . Thus, Pr[vi ≤ αj] = c−j + βj(c+j − c−j ) = c, where the
randomness is over the distribution of costs and the random choice of αj . We can prove that the mechanism
is perfectly data private, BIC, and EIIR by arguments similar to those in the proofs of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2.
Since every player has equal probability c to accept the contract, we can show that the mechanism satisfies
ǫ-differential privacy of estimate and is O(ǫ−1)-accurate by arguments similar to those in the proofs of
Lemmas 3.5 and 3.7. In order to satisfy differential privacy of payments, we let γ := maxj α+j −minj α−j .
Then, the payments satisfy ǫ-differential privacy by an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3.6.
Cost of Mechanism. For a fixed ǫ, when c increases, the accuracy of Mechanism is improved, since Mech-
anism 1 uses more players’ data. However, Mechanism 1’s expected total payment also increases. Since
Mechanism 1 is
√
3(n1(1−c)c +
2
ǫ2c2
)-accurate, there is a trade-off between the accuracy and the expected
total payment. Since the mechanism can pick c freely, for a given ǫ >
√
8
n , the mechanism can pick
c =
1+
√
1−8ǫ−2/n
2 . Let α = maxj αj . The expected total payment is ǫαcn = αn(
ǫ+
√
ǫ2−8/n
2 ). Then,
Mechanism 1 picks a suitable ǫ, such that the expected total payment ǫαcn = B. Hence, the mechanism is
budget-feasible in expectation and is O( 1ǫc) = O(
αn
B ) accurate.
Fixed Accuracy. If the data analyst wants a k-accurate mechanism, we can pick c = 1
1+k2/6n
and ǫ =
2
√
3(1+k2/6n)
k , such that the mechanism is k-accurate. The expected total payment is ǫαcn =
2
√
3αn
k .
Computing F−1(c). In an ideal model, when Fj is a continuous distribution, we assume that mechanism
can access the closed form of Fj , such that the mechanism can compute α = F−1j (c) accurately. However,
when the mechanism cannot access the closed form of Fj , F−1j (c) may not be computable. When it is
impossible to access the closed form of Fj , we assume that there is an oracle, which returns Fj(v) for
any given value v. In the oracle model, the mechanism finds α−j , α
+
j for all j, such that Fj(α
−
j ) < c,
Fj(α
+
j ) > c, and α
+
j − α−j < δ for δ < 1/n using binary search. Then, the mechanism uses the method
that we use for discrete cost distributions to construct the contract. That is, let βj =
c−c−j
c+j −c
−
j
. Player i is
given a contract “If Di = j, your expected payment is ǫαj in expectation,” where Pr[αj = α−j ] = 1 − βj
and Pr[αj = α+j ] = βj . Thus, Pr[vi ≤ αj] = c−j + βj(c+j − c−j ) = c, where the randomness is over the
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distribution of costs and the random choice of αj . Hence, the mechanism is still perfectly data private, BIC,
EIIR, ǫ-differential private, and O(1/ǫ)-accurate. In the oracle model, the expected payment for player i
with Di = j who accepts the contract is at most α+j . In the ideal model, the expected payment for player i
with Di = j who accepts the contract is F−1j (c), which is smaller than α
+
j . Since α
+
j − F−1j (c) is at most
δ < 1/n, the difference between the expected payments in the ideal model and in the oracle model is at
most 1/n for each player. Thus, the difference between the expected total payment in the ideal model and
in the oracle model is at most 1.
4 Optimality
In this section, we define a benchmark for the expected payment of a mechanism and compare the expected
payment of Mechanism 1 to this benchmark in two different settings. The benchmark mechanism is not
only truthful but also knows Di for all i and has no privacy requirements. We show that when all costs are
non-negative, Mechanism 1 is provably close to the benchmark.
The benchmark is the minimum expected payment among all truthful mechanisms M∗ that satisfy the
following properties. In order to get a meaningful estimate, for any k < n/2, a k-accurate mechanism
learns a subset of players’ data. We call this subset a sample set. Since obtaining an estimate based on an
unbiased sample is a common approach in statistics, we assume that M∗ uses an unbiased sample. Suppose
that there are nj players with Di = j for j ∈ [h]. Since the sample set is unbiased, there exists c such that
M∗ buys wj = cnj data from players with Di = j. After getting an unbiased sample, M∗ uses w1/c as the
straightforward estimate of n1. Since the choices of c may effect the accuracy guarantee, we compare the
payment of Mechanism 1 to the payment of M∗, where Mechanism 1 and M∗ have the same size of sample
sets. Thus, M∗ is a truthful mechanism that gets an unbiased sample with size cn for a fixed number c.
Since there is no competition between players with data j and players with data j′ 6= j, M∗ can run
auctions for players with Di = j for all j ∈ [h] independently and buy wj data from players with Di = j.
The mechanism that guarantees buying w units is called w-unit procurement mechanism. Thus, M∗ is a
mechanism that runs a truthful, wj-unit procurement mechanism for each j ∈ [h].
Mechanism 1 buys in expectation wj data from players with Di = j for j ∈ [h]. We compare the
expected payment of Mechanism 1 for buying in expectation wj data from players with Di = j with the
expected payment of M∗ for buying wj data from players with Di = j for each j. If the expected payment
of Mechanism 1 is at most r times the expected payment of M∗ for each j, then the total expected payment
of Mechanism 1 is at most r times the total expected payment of M∗. Thus, we focus on a single auction
that all players have the same Di and both Mechanism 1 and the M∗ want to buy w data from n players.
For multi-unit procurement mechanisms, let xi be the indicator random variable denoting whether the
mechanism buys from player i. Let vi be the cost to the player i, if xi = 1. Let pi be the payment of player
i. The utility for player i is pi − xivi. Note that when we consider privacy preserving mechanisms, the
utility of player i is pi − ǫxivi. However, since ǫ is the same for all players, we can ignore ǫ without loss
of generality, that is, scaling every player’s cost by ǫ. Without loss of generality, we suppose that players
report costs v1 ≤ v2 · · · ≤ vn.
4.1 Envy-free Benchmark
A mechanism is envy-free if for all v and for all i, j, pi − vixi ≥ pj − vixj . We show that for any
envy-free, multi-unit procurement mechanism, every data that is bought by the mechanism is purchased
at the same price. Suppose that a multi-unit procurement mechanism buys data from two players at two
different prices. Since the player with the lower price wants to have the higher price, the mechanism is not
envy-free. We compare the expected payment of Mechanism 1 with the expected payment of the optimal,
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envy-free, dominant strategy truthful, multi-unit procurement mechanism. We use envy-free mechanisms
as a benchmark, because for procurement mechanisms in a Bayesian setting, the optimal mechanisms are
known to charge a fixed price.3
We introduce another commonly used solution concept as follows. A profile of strategies q1, . . . , qn is a
dominant strategy equilibrium if for all i, vi,v−i, and y′i ∈ Y ,E[ui(q(vi, v−i,D), vi)] ≥ E[ui((y′i, q−i(v−i,D−i)), vi)],
where the randomness is from the mechanism. A direct mechanism is dominant strategy truthful if qi(vi,Di) =
vi is a dominant strategy equilibrium for every player i. The following lemma characterizes the total pay-
ment for any dominant strategy truthful, EPIR, and envy-free mechanisms.
Lemma 4.1 (Theorem 4.6 in [8]). No dominant strategy truthful, EPIR, and envy-free w-unit procurement
mechanism can have total payment less than wvw+1.
Let F be the cumulative distribution function of players’ costs, that is, F (a) = Pr[v ≤ a]. By Lemma
4.1, the total expected payment of any dominant strategy truthful, EPIR, and envy-free w-unit procurement
mechanism is at least wEv∼F [vw+1]. Thus, our benchmark is wEv∼F [vw+1].
Now, we compare the benchmark with the expected payment of Mechanism 1. There are two cases.
First, when there exists α such that F (α) = wn , Mechanism 1 offers a posted price α for each player in order
to buy w players’ data in expectation. If player i accepts the price, the mechanism buys from player i with
expected payment α. Since each player has probability wn to accept the contract, the total expected payment
of Mechanism 1 is wα.
Second, when there is no α such that F (α) = wn , we give an extension to Mechanism 1 in Section
3.1. The extension finds the largest α− and the smallest α+, such that F (α−) < wn and F (α
+) > wn . Let
c− := F (α−), c+ := F (α+), and β :=
w
n
−c−
c+−c− . Then, the mechanism offers a price α
+ with probability
β and price α− with probability 1 − β. For a player with cost at most α−, since the player always accepts
the offer, the expected payment is (α−(1 − β) + α+β). For a player with cost equal to α+, since the
player accepts the offer only when the offered price is α+, the expected payment is α+β. For a player
with cost larger than α+, since the player always rejects the offer, the expected payment is 0. Since each
player has a cost at most α− with probability c− and has a cost equal to α+ with probability c+ − c−, each
player’s expected payment is c−(α−(1− β) + α+β) + (c+ − c−)α+β. Thus, the total expected payment is
n(c−(α−(1− β) + α+β) + (c+ − c−)α+β) by the linearity of expectation. Moreover,
n(c−(α−(1− β) + α+β) + (c+ − c−)α+β) = n(c−(α−(1− β) + α+β) + (w
n
− c−)α+)
= n(
w
n
α+ + c−(α−(1− β) + α+β − α+))
= n(
w
n
α+ + c−((1 − β)(α− − α+))
= n(
w
n
α+ − c−((1 − β)(α+ − α−)))
= w(α+ − nc
−
w
(1− β)(α+ − α−)).
When there exists α, such that F (α) = wn , the expected payment of Mechanism 1 is wα. When α does
not exist, the expected payment is w(α+− nc−w (1− β)(α+−α−)). Thus, we should compare both wα and
w(α+− nc−w (1−β)(α+−α−)) withwEv∼F [vw+1]. It suffices to compare α and α+− nc
−
w (1−β)(α+−α−)
with Ev∼F [vw+1].
Lemma 4.2. 1. If there exists α such that F (α) = wn , then Ev∼F [vw+1] ≥ 12α.
2. If there is no α such that F (α) = wn , then Ev∼F [vw+1] ≥ 12(α+ − nwc−(1− β)(α+ − α−)).
3Envy-free benchmarks are also common in prior-free mechanism design [10].
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Proof. We show the second statement. The first statement follows by setting α− = α+ = α.
Let η = α+ − nc−w (1− β)(α+ − α−). By conditional probability,
E[vw+1] = Pr[vw+1 ≤ η]× E[vw+1 | vw+1 ≤ η] + Pr[vw+1 > η]× E[vw+1 | vw+1 > η]
≥ Pr[vw+1 > η]× η (costs are non-negative).
It suffices to show that Pr[vw+1 > η] ≥ 12 . Since c− < wn , nc
−
w < 1. Since β < 1 and
nc−
w < 1,
α− < η < α+. If vw+1 > η, then vw+1 ≥ α+, since α+ is the smallest number larger than α− with
non-zero probability. Let v(i) denote the cost of player i. If vw+1 ≥ α+, then at most w players’ v(i)
are no larger than α−. Since each v(i) is independently drawn from F , Pr[v(i) ≤ α−] = c−. Let Xi be
the indicator random variable such that Xi = 1 if v(i) ≤ α−, otherwise Xi = 0. Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi. The
probability that at most w players have v(i) no larger than α− is Pr[X ≤ w]. Since the Xi’s are independent,
identical, indicator random variables, X is a random variable from a binomial distribution Bin(n, c−). Thus,
Pr[vw+1 ≥ α+] = Pr[bin(n, c−) ≤ w].
Now, we show that Pr[bin(n, c−) ≤ w] ≥ 12 . We say m is the median of a distribution D over real
numbers if, Pr[Z ≤ m] ≥ 12 and Pr[Z ≥ m] ≥ 12 , where Z is a random variable drawn from D. For a
binomial distribution Bin(n, p), the expected value np and the median m satisfy ⌊np⌋ ≤ m ≤ ⌈np⌉ [11].
Since c− < wn , the expected value of bin(n, c
−) is smaller than w. Since ⌈nc−⌉ ≤ w, the median m of
Bin(n, c−) is at most w. Thus, Pr[bin(n, c−) ≤ w] ≥ 12 .
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 imply the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Mechanism 1’s expected payment is 2-approximate to the benchmark.
4.2 Anti-regular Distributions
In this section, we compare the expected payment of Mechanism 1 with the expected payment of the optimal
BIC, multi-unit procurement mechanism. We first characterize randomized BIC procurement mechanisms.
For a randomized mechanism and a given bid vi, let x¯i(vi) be the probability that the mechanism buys from
player i and let pi(vi) be the random variable denoting the payment for player i, where both x¯i and pi’s
randomness come from the mechanism and v−i. Suppose that when vi = ∞, the mechanism will not buy
from player i. That is, x¯i(∞) = 0 and E[pi(∞)] = 0. The characterization for the BIC, procurement
mechanisms is analogous to the characterization of BIC selling mechanisms, which is a well-known result
in auction theory. We provide a proof of the following characterization in the Appendix.
Lemma 4.4. A randomized procurement mechanism is BIC if and only if for every i the procurement prob-
ability x¯ and payment p satisfies
(i) x¯i(vi) is decreasing in vi;
(ii) E[pi(vi)] = vix¯i(vi) +
∫∞
vi
x¯i(t)dt.
To prove the optimality of selling mechanisms, Myerson [14] introduces a virtual value function. The
analogous function for procurement mechanisms is a virtual cost function, which is φ(z) := z+ F (z)f(z) . Thus,
to ensure that φ(z) is well-defined and the integral of f is well-defined (used in the proof of Lemma 4.5 and
Lemma 4.7), we assume
Assumption 1. Let f be the density probability function of distribution F with range [a, b] ⊆ [0,∞). f is
piecewise continuous and f(z) is positive for all z ∈ [a, b].
A distribution F is anti-regular if F satisfies Assumption 1 and φ(z) is increasing in z.4
4For selling mechanisms, a distribution is regular if the virtual value φ′(z) = z − 1−F (z)
f(z)
is increasing in z.
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When the distribution F is anti-regular, [6] characterize the optimal dominant strategy truthful mecha-
nism to minimize the expected payment for path auctions. Although their problem is not exactly the same
as w-unit procurement mechanisms, their result can be extended to procurement mechanisms easily. For
completeness, we provide a proof of the following lemma for our setting in the Appendix.
Lemma 4.5. When the distribution F is anti-regular, the optimal BIC w-unit procurement buys from the w
players with the smallest virtual cost.
Since φ(z) is increasing in z, the optimal mechanism buys from the first w players. By Lemma 4.4,
the expected payment for player i ≤ w is vw+1. Thus, the total expected payment of the optimal BIC
mechanism is wEv∼F [vw+1]. Thus, our benchmark is wEv∼F [vw+1]. We compare the expected payment
of Mechanism 1 with wEv∼F [vw+1], when F is anti-regular.
Theorem 4.6. When F is anti-regular, Mechanism 1’s expected payment is 2-approximate to the benchmark.
Proof. Since F satisfies Assumption 1 by definition of anti-regular, F−1 is well-defined. The total expected
payment of Mechanism 1 is wF−1(wn ). When F is anti-regular, the benchmark is wEv∼F [vw+1]. By
Lemma 4.2, Mechanism 1 is 2-approximate.
4.3 General Distributions
When the distribution satisfies Assumption 1 but φ(z) is not increasing in z, buying from the w players with
smallest virtual cost may result in a non-truthful mechanism. We can use the ironing procedure, which is
designed by Myerson [14], to resolve this issue. For a fixed cost vector v, ironing procedure irons on interval
[a, b), if vi ∈ [a, b), then vi is replaced by a random number v′i, which is drawn from the distribution F on
[a, b). By a way similar to Myerson’s method, we can identify a set S of intervals, such that the ironed
virtual cost function φ¯(z) = E[φ(z)] is increasing in z. Moreover, for an ironed interval [a, b), φ¯(z) is the
same for all z ∈ [a, b). The formal definitions of the ironed interval set S and ironed virtual cost function
are in the appendix.
Lemma 4.7. The w-unit procurement mechanism that buys from the w players with smallest ironed virtual
cost and breaks ties uniformly at random is the optimal BIC mechanism when the distribution satisfies
Assumption 1.
Thus, our benchmark is the expected payment of the optimal BIC mechanism, M , when the distribution
satisfies Assumption 1. In order to calculate the expected payment of M , we specify the payment rule as
follows. Let x¯i(vi, v−i) be the probability that M buys from player i, where the randomness comes from the
mechanism. Since M buys from the w players with smallest ironed virtual cost, x¯i(vi, v−i) is decreasing
in vi for any fixed v−i. Let pi(vi, v−i) be the random variable denoting the payment for player i, where
E[pi(vi, v−i)] = vix¯i(vi, v−i)+
∫∞
vi
x¯i(t, v−i)dt and the randomness comes from the mechanism. It is easy
to see that this payment rule satisfies Lemma 4.4.
We compare the expected payment of Mechanism 1 with the benchmark.
Theorem 4.8. Let F satisfy Assumption 1. Let S be the set of ironed intervals for F . If every interval
[a, b) ∈ S satisfies a ≥ b/r for some r > 1, then the expected payment of Mechanism 1 is 2r-approximate
to the benchmark.
Proof. Since F satisfies Assumption 1, F−1 is well-defined. The expected payment of Mechanism 1 is
wF−1(wn ). We compare the expected payment of the optimal BIC mechanism, M , with wF
−1(wn ). Let
pi(v) be the random variable representing the payment for player i in M when the cost vector is v. We
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show that Ev∼F,M [
∑
i∈[n] pi(v)] ≥ Ev∼F [vw+1]/r, which implies Ev∼F,M [
∑
i∈[n] pi(v)] ≥ F−1(wn )/2r
by Lemma 4.2 and hence Mechanism 1 is 2r-approximate.
There are two sources of randomness in mechanism M . One is from the cost vector v since v is drawn
from a distribution F . Another one is M itself since M is a randomized mechanism. For a fixed cost vector
v, let pvi be the random variable representing the payment for player i, where the randomness only comes
from M . We show that for any fixed v, EM [
∑
i∈[n] p
v
i ] ≥ wvw+1/r. This implies Ev∼F,M [
∑
i∈[n] pi(v)] ≥
Ev∼F [vw+1]/r. There are three cases.
Case 1: vw+1 is not in any ironed interval. Since M chooses the w players with smallest ironed virtual costs
and the ironed virtual cost is increasing, M buys from the first w players. For player i ≤ w, if vi increases
to t < vw+1, by the monotonicity of φ¯, the mechanism still buys from player i. That is x¯i(t, v−i) = 1 for all
t < vw+1. When t > vw+1, the mechanism will not buy from player i. Thus, by definition of the expected
payment, the expected payment for each player i ≤ w is vi +
∫∞
vi
x¯i(t, v−i)dt = vi +
∫ vw+1
vi
x¯i(t, v−i)dt =
vw+1. Since expected payment for player i > w is 0, EM [
∑
i∈[n] p
v
i ] = wvw+1.
Case 2: vw+1 is in an ironed interval [a, b) but vw /∈ [a, b). Since for all player i ≤ w, vi /∈ [a, b), M
buys from the first w players. For player i ≤ w, x¯i(t, v−i) = 1 for all t < a. By definition of the expected
payment, the expected payment for player i ≤ w is vi+
∫∞
vi
x¯i(t, v−i)dt ≥ vi +
∫ a
vi
x¯i(t, v−i)dt = a. Thus,
EM [
∑
i∈[n] p
v
i ] ≥ wa ≥ wb/r ≥ wvw+1/r.
Case 3: vw+1 and vw are in the same ironed interval [a, b). Let l1 = |{i : vi < a}| and l2 = |{i : vi ∈
[a, b)}|. Thus, l1 < w and l1+l2 > w. The mechanism always buys from the first l1 players. Since φ¯(t) is the
same for all t ∈ [a, b) and the mechanism breaks ties uniformly at random, the mechanism buys from player
i, l1+1 ≤ i ≤ l1+ l2, with probability w−l1l2 . For player i ≤ l1, x¯i(t, v−i) = 1 if t < a. By definition of the
expected payment, the expected payment for player i ≤ l1 is vi+
∫∞
vi
x¯i(t, v−i)dt ≥ vi+
∫ a
vi
x¯i(t, v−i)dt =
a. For player i, l1 < i ≤ l1 + l2, when vi increases to t < b, since φ¯(t) is the same for all t ∈ [a, b),
the probability that the mechanism buys from player i does not change. That is, x¯i(t, v−i) = w−l1l2 if
t ∈ [a, b). By definition of the expected payment, the expected payment for player i, l1 < i ≤ l1 + l2, is
vix¯i(vi, v−i) +
∫∞
vi
x¯i(t, v−i)dt =
b(w−l1)
l2
. Therefore, EM [
∑
i∈[n] p
v
i ] ≥ al1 + l2 b(w−l1)l2 ≥ wa ≥ wb/r ≥
wvw+1/r.
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A Optimal Procurement Mechanisms
We first characterize the BIC randomized procurement mechanisms in a way similar to Myerson’s charac-
terization of truthful selling mechanisms [14] [15]. We assume x¯i(∞) = 0 and E[pi(∞)] = 0.
Lemma A.1 (Lemma 4.4). A randomized procurement mechanism is BIC if and only if for every i the
procurement probability x¯ and payment p satisfies
(i) x¯i(vi) is decreasing in vi;
(ii) E[pi(vi)] = vix¯i(vi) +
∫∞
vi
x¯i(t)dt.
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Proof. (→) We need to show that for all v′i, E[pi(vi)]− vix¯i(vi) ≥ E[pi(v′i)]− vix¯i(v′i). By (ii), it is equal
to show
∫∞
vi
x¯i(t)dt ≥
∫∞
v′i
x¯i(t)dt+(v
′
i−vi)x¯i(v′i). If v′i > vi, then it equals
∫ v′i
vi
x¯i(t)dt ≥ (v′i−vi)x¯i(v′i),
which is true due to the monotonicity of x¯i. If v′i < vi, it equals (vi− v′i)x¯i(v′i) ≥
∫ vi
v′i
x¯i(t)dt, which is true
due to the monotonicity of x¯i.
(←) Since the mechanism is BIC, for all vi and v′i, E[pi(vi)] − vix¯i(vi) ≥ E[pi(v′i)] − vix¯i(v′i). Sym-
metrically, we have E[pi(vi)] − v′ix¯i(vi) ≤ E[pi(v′i)] − v′ix¯i(v′i). By subtracting the inequalities, we
get (v′i − vi)x¯i(vi) ≥ (v′i − vi)x¯i(v′i), which implies (i). By rearranging these two inequalities, we get
v′i(x¯i(vi) − x¯i(v′i)) ≥ E[pi(vi)] − E[pi(v′i)] ≥ vi(x¯i(vi) − x¯i(v′i)). Let v′i = vi + ǫ, and divide all by ǫ.
When ǫ→ 0, both sides have the same value. Thus, we get v dx¯i(vi)dvi =
dE[pi(vi)]
dvi
. Since x¯i(∞) = 0 implies
E[pi(∞)] = 0, we have pi(vi) =
∫ vi
∞ vx¯
′
i(vi)dv. Applying integration by parts, we can get (ii).
When the cost of players are drawn from a publicly known distribution F , we characterize the optimal
BIC mechanism to minimize the payment, when F is anti-regular. In [14], Myerson characterizes the opti-
mal BIC mechanism to maximize the revenue for selling mechanisms assuming the distribution is regular.
The proof of Lemma A.2 follows the proof of Myersons’s characterization [15].
Lemma A.2. [Lemma 4.5] When the distribution F is anti-regular, the optimal BIC w-unit procurement
buys from the w players with the smallest virtual cost.
Proof. Let φ(z) = z + F (z)f(z) . Suppose that for any BIC mechanism, the expected payment is equal to its
expected virtual cost, that is Ev∼F [
∑
i∈[n] pi(v)] = Ev∼F [
∑
i∈[n] φ(vi)xi(v)]. This implies that if the
mechanism buys from w players the with the smallest virtual cost, then the mechanism minimizes the
payment. Moreover, since F is anti-regular, φ(z) = z + F (z)f(z) is increasing in z. Since the mechanism
buys from w players with smallest virtual cost, x¯i(vi) is decreasing in vi for all i. Hence, the mechanism is
BIC. Thus, it suffices to show that Ev∼F [
∑
i∈[n] pi(v)] = Ev∼F [
∑
i∈[n] φ(vi)xi(v)].
In order to show that the expected payment is equal to its expected virtual cost, it suffices to show that
the expected payment of player i is Ev∼F [φ(vi)x¯i(vi)], since each vi is drawn from F independently.
Lemma A.3. The expected payment of player i is Ev∼F [φ(vi)x¯i(vi)].
Proof. Since the density function f is piecewise continuous, there exists a partition [a1, b1], . . . , [ah, bh] of
f ’s domain, such that f is continuous within every interval [ai, bi]. Note that bi = ai+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ h−1.
Ev[pi(vi)] =
h∑
j=1
(∫ bj
aj
E[pi(vi)]f(vi)dvi
)
=
h∑
j=1
(∫ bj
aj
vix¯i(vi)f(vi)dvi +
∫ bj
aj
∫ bh
vi
x¯i(z)f(vi)dzdvi
)
(Lemma 4.4)
=
h∑
j=1
(∫ bj
aj
vix¯i(vi)f(vi)dvi
+
∫ bj
aj
x¯i(z)
∫ z
aj
f(vi)dvidz +
∫ bh
bj
x¯i(z)
∫ bj
aj
f(vi)dvidz
)
(switch the order of integration)
=
h∑
j=1
(∫ bj
aj
vix¯i(vi)f(vi)dvi
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+∫ bj
aj
x¯i(z)(F (z) − F (aj))dz +
∫ bh
bj
x¯i(z)(F (bj)− F (aj))dz
)
=
h∑
j=1
(∫ bj
aj
x¯i(vi)(vif(vi) + F (vi))dvi
−F (aj)
∫ bj
aj
x¯i(vi)dvi + (F (bj)− F (aj))
∫ bh
bj
x¯i(vi)dvi
)
=
h∑
j=1
(∫ bj
aj
x¯i(vi)(vif(vi) + F (vi))dvi − F (aj)
∫ bh
aj
x¯i(vi)dvi + F (bj)
∫ bh
bj
x¯i(vi)dvi
)
=
h∑
j=1
(∫ bj
aj
x¯i(vi)(vif(vi) + F (vi))dvi
)
−
h∑
j=1
(
F (aj)
∫ bh
aj
x¯i(vi)dvi − F (bj)
∫ bh
bj
x¯i(vi)dvi
)
=
h∑
j=1
(∫ bj
aj
x¯i(vi)(vi +
F (vi)
f(vi)
)f(vi)dvi
)
−
h∑
j=1
(
F (aj)
∫ bh
aj
x¯i(vi)dvi − F (bj)
∫ bh
bj
x¯i(vi)dvi
)
= Evi [φ(vi)x¯i(vi)] (F (a1) = 0, bi = ai+1 for all i ≤ i ≤ h− 1)
(End of proof of Lemma A.2)
Now, we consider the case that F satisfies Assumption 1 but φ(z) is not monotone in z. For selling
mechanisms, Myerson [14] designs an ironing procedure to get the optimal BIC mechanism to maximize
the revenue when F satisfies Assumption 1. We show how to iron virtual values in the setting of procurement
mechanism and use this to design an optimal BIC mechanism to minimize the payment.
Suppose that the φ(z) is not monotone. We want to transform φ(z) to another function φ¯(z), such that
φ¯(z) is increasing in z. Let q = F (v) and h(q) = φ(F−1(q)). Since the density function f is always
positive, F is a strictly increasing. Thus, φ(z) is increasing in z if and only if h(q) is increasing in q.
Moreover, h(q) is increasing in q if and only if H(q) =
∫ q
0 h(t)dt is convex. However, H is not convex,
since φ(z) is not monotone. Thus, we want to modify H to get a convex function G and define φ¯(z) based
on G.
Let S be the epigraph of H , that is S = {(q, y) | y ≥ H(q)}. Geometrically, if we draw y = H(q) on
a plane, then S is the area containing H and above H . Let conv (S) denote the convex hull of set S. The
convex hull of H(q) is G(q) = min{y | (q, y) ∈ conv (S)} (Chapter 5 in [17]). Geometrically, if we draw
y = G(q) on a plane, then G is the lower boundary of conv (S). By definition, a function is convex if its
epigraph is a convex set. Since the epigraph of G, conv (S), is a convex set, G is convex. Since G is the
lower boundary of conv (S), G(q) ≤ H(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1].
We define the ironed interval set and φ¯(z) as follows. Let T be the set of points that H(q) and G(q)
differ, that is, T = {q | H(q) 6= G(q)}. Let S be the smallest set of intervals [yi, zi), such that T =
∪i(yi, zi). The ironed interval set is defined as { [F−1(yi), F−1(zi)) | [yi, zi) ∈ S}. Since G is convex, G
is differentiable on a dense subset of [0, 1] by Theorem 25.5 in [17]. We define g(q) := dGdq (q), whenever
dG
dq (q) is well-defined, and extend g to [0, 1] by right-continuity. The ironed virtual cost function is defined
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as φ¯(z) = g(F (z)).
Lemma A.4 (Lemma 4.7). The w-unit procurement mechanism that buys from the w players with smallest
ironed virtual cost and breaks ties uniformly at random is the optimal BIC mechanism when the distribution
satisfies Assumption 1.
Proof. Since G is a convex function, g(q) is increasing in q. Thus, φ¯(z) is increasing in z. Since φ¯(z) is
increasing in z and the mechanism buys from the w players with smallest ironed virtual cost, the mechanism
is BIC. We only need to show that the mechanism minimizes the payment. First, we want to relate the
mechanism’s payment to φ¯(z). Since the density function f is piecewise continuous, there exists a partition
[a1, b1], . . . , [ah, bh] of f ’s domain, such that f is continuous within every interval [ai, bi]. Note that bi =
ai+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ h − 1. For any BIC mechanism, x¯i(vi) is decreasing in vi by Lemma 4.4. For a fixed
x¯i,
Ev∼F [pi(vi)] = Ev[φ(vi)x¯i(vi)] (Lemma A.3)
= Ev[φ¯(vi)x¯i(vi)]− Ev[(φ¯(vi)− φ(vi))x¯i(vi)]
= Ev[φ¯(vi)x¯i(vi)]−
h∑
j=1
∫ bj
aj
(φ¯(vi)− φ(vi))x¯i(vi)f(vi)dvi
= Ev[φ¯(vi)x¯i(vi)]−
h∑
j=1
∫ bj
aj
(g(F (vi))− h(F (vi)))x¯i(vi)f(vi)dvi
= Ev[φ¯(vi)x¯i(vi)]−
h∑
j=1
(G(F (vi))−H(F (vi)))x¯i(vi)|bjvi=aj
+
h∑
j=1
∫ bj
aj
(H(vi)−G(vi))dx¯i(vi) (integration by parts)
= Ev[φ¯(vi)x¯i(vi)] +
h∑
j=1
∫ bj
aj
(H(F (vi))−G(F (vi)))dx¯i(vi)
The last equality holds since G(0) = H(0) and G(1) = H(1) by the definition of G and bi = ai+1 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ h − 1. In the second term of the last line, the derivative of x¯i is non-positive, since x¯i(vi) is
decreasing in vi. Moreover, H(F (vi)) −G(F (vi)) is non-negative for all vi, because G(q) ≤ H(q) for all
q ∈ [0, 1]. In order to minimize the payment, we need to choose an allocation function x¯i to minimize the
magnitude of the second term. We show that the second term is zero when the mechanism buys from the w
players with smallest ironed virtual cost and breaks ties uniformly at random.
For any q ∈ [0, 1], if H(q) − G(q) is zero, then the contribution to the second term is zero. Thus, we
only need to consider where G and H differ. Since G is the convex hull of H , whenever G < H , G must
be flat. That is, for any [a, b) ∈ S, g(q) has the same value for all q ∈ [a, b). Since φ¯(F−1(q)) = g(q),
every vi ∈ [F−1(a), F−1(b)) has the same ironed virtual cost. Since the mechanism breaks ties uniformly
at random, x¯i(vi) is constant for all vi ∈ [F−1(a), F−1(b)). Thus, the derivative of x¯i(vi) is zero for all
vi ∈ [F−1(a), F−1(b)). Since x¯i(vi) is zero for all vi ∈ [F−1(a), F−1(b)), it contributes nothing to the
second term. Thus, the second term is always zero since if H(F (vi)) − G(F (vi)) is non-zero, then x¯i(vi)
is zero. Hence, the mechanism minimizes the payment.
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